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NOTE
FALLING THROUGH THE CRACK: How COURTS HAVE
STRUGGLED TO APPLY THE CRACK
AMENDMENT TO "NOMINAL CAREER" AND
"PLEA BARGAIN" DEFENDANTS
Maxwell Arlie Halpern Kosman*
In 2007, after a decade of debate, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
instituted an amendment that decreased the sentences of some defendants who had been convicted of crack-cocaine-relatedoffenses.
A few months later, the Sentencing Commission passed another
amendment that rendered it retroactive.Nearly three years after the
passage and retroactive application of the "crack amendment,"
however, two separate circuit splits have emerged as courts have
struggled to uniformly interpretand apply the Sentencing Commission's directives. The first circuit split emerged regarding the
eligibility of a subset of "career offenders" to the benefits of the
retroactive application of the crack amendment. The second circuit
split emerged over the question whether a subset of defendants who
pled guilty to crack offenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure11(c)(1)(C) priorto the passage of the crack amendment
are eligible to receive the benefits of its retroactive application.
This Note first argues that the language of the applicable statutes
and policy statements and the specific actions taken by the Sentencing Commission indicate that the subset of "career offenders" in
the first circuit split are not eligible for a subsequent reduction in
the sentence pursuant to the crack amendment. This Note argues,
however, that the lack of explicit directives from the Sentencing
Commission regarding the "plea bargain" defendants in the second
circuit split indicates that these defendants are eligible to receive
the benefits of the retroactive application of the amendment. Because the Sentencing Commission instituted and rendered
retroactive the crack amendment to decrease the disparity in sentence between defendants convicted of crack and powder cocaine
offenses, it would be contrary to the purpose of the amendment to
exclude these defendantsfrom its benefits.
*
J.D. Candidate, May 2011. 1am particularly grateful to Dave Gorlin, Matt Miller, and the
Volume 109 Notes Office of the Michigan Law Review for their guidance and patience. Thanks also
to Professor J.J. Prescott for his advice and commentary on early drafts of this Note. Finally, thanks
to my family and friends for their encouragement and support.
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CRACK AMENDMENT

INTRODUCTION

When the "crack amendment" to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines finally took effect on November 1, 2007, it was overdue by any metric. The
U.S. Sentencing Commission' had been lobbying Congress in vain for ten
years to remedy the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine
offenses, which caused defendants convicted of crack offenses-who were
disproportionately African American 2-to receive much stiffer punishments
than those who were convicted of possessing similar quantities of powder
1.

According to an overview publication by the commission:

The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency in the judicial branch of
government. Its principal purposes are: (1) to establish sentencing policies and practices for the
federal courts, including guidelines to be consulted regarding the appropriate form and severity
of punishment for offenders convicted of federal crimes; (2) to advise and assist Congress and
the executive branch in the development of effective and efficient crime policy; and (3) to collect, analyze, research, and distribute a broad array of information on federal crime and
sentencing issues, serving as an information resource for Congress, the executive branch, the
courts, criminal justice practitioners, the academic community, and the public.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION

(2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCOverview_200906.pdf.
2.

See infra Section I.B.

I
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cocaine.3 Finally, the commission took action itself and passed the amendment,4 which assumed legal force after Congress took no affirmative steps to
prevent its passage.! A few months later, the Sentencing Commission voted
to apply the crack amendment retroactively.6 As expected, the commission
members patted themselves on the back for a job well done and the Bush
Administration disapproved.' However, the fight over the retroactive application of this amendment was far from over. Two-and-a-half years after the
amendment was applied retroactively, federal courts are still grappling with
its application. Two circuit court splits on the subject have emerged, both of
which have profound implications on individual defendants' sentences.
The first circuit split questions whether a subset of "career-offender"9
defendants are eligible for a reduction in their sentence pursuant to the crack
amendment. While reducing these defendants' sentences may seem fair, the
plain language of the policy statement governing the application of retroactive amendments indicates that these defendants are ineligible for the
sentencing reduction." All of the circuit courts that have addressed this
question have reached that conclusion except the Second Circuit.
Meanwhile, a more difficult and interesting question has emerged regarding defendants who, prior to the passage of the crack amendment, pled
guilty pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) to a sentence that was explicitly calculated in accordance with the pre-amendment
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. While many courts have yet to address this
question, a majority of circuits have indicated that these defendants are also
ineligible for a reduction in sentence."
This Note argues that the exclusion of these plea bargain defendants
from the benefits of the crack amendment runs counter to the goals that motivated the amendment's enactment. Further, the Sentencing Commission's
response to the "career-offender" circuit split provides insight into the
commission's view of the "plea bargain" circuit split. By speaking clearly to
3. David Stout, Retroactively, Panel Reduces Drug Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, at
Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/12/washington/12sentence.html. This sentencing
disparity was controversial in part because crack and powder cocaine are derivatives of the same
drug. Id.
4. U.S.
Nov. 1, 2007).
5.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

app. C supp., amend. 706 (2009) (effective

28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, RULES
(2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/RULESI l0.pdf.

OF PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE

6.

USSG app. C., amend. 713 (2009) (effective Mar. 3, 2008); see Stout, supra note 3.

7. See Stout, supra note 3. ("'At its core, this question is one of fairness,' said one commission member, Judge William K. Sessions III of the United States District Court in Vermont. 'This is
an historic day. This system of justice is, and must always be, colorblind.'").
8. Id. ("The Bush administration restated its opposition to making the lighter sentences
retroactive. 'Our position is clear,' Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey said Tuesday at a news
conference.").
9.

See infra Part II.

10.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

11.

SeeinfraPartlIl.

§ 1B1.10 (2008).
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the impact of the crack amendment on career offenders, the commission
implicitly instructed judges not to apply the amendment to plea bargain offenders. Part I provides the histories of the federal sentencing system and
the crack amendment. Part II then discusses the career-offender circuit split
and concludes that the majority of courts are correct in excluding these offenders from the benefits of the crack amendment. Finally, Part III argues
that the current majority view in the plea bargain circuit split is, in contrast
to the predominant view on the career-offender question, at odds with the
intentions of both Congress and the Sentencing Commission.
I. THE

HISTORY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING AND THE CRACK AMENDMENT

A. The FederalSentencing System

This Section provides background on the federal sentencing process.
First, it discusses the sentencing mechanics that were in place prior to the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Booker. Second, it discusses pertinent aspects of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which governs plea
bargains in the federal system. These two pieces of background information
are essential to an understanding of the two circuit splits: both splits
emerged as a result of the strict sentencing mechanics outlined in this Section. Finally, this Section explains the effect that Booker has had on the two
circuit splits.
The federal sentencing regime, meant to check judges' broad discretion
to determine convicted defendants' sentences, 3 has been frought with controversy since its inception. The Sentencing Reform Act (the "SRA")' 4-the
statutory basis for the federal sentencing system-was passed in 1984, but
"[t]he guidelines did not become fully operational until 1989 because many
of the first guideline cases focused primarily on constitutional challenges to
the SRA's entire approach to sentencing reform."'" In 1989, the Supreme
Court determined that the creation of a U.S. Sentencing Commission, intended to promulgate the mandatory federal sentencing structure, was
within Congress's constitutional bounds."
The Sentencing Commission set out to establish a framework that met
the two seemingly conflicting congressional objectives motivating the sentencing system. First, the commission sought to establish a regime that
would "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
12.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

13.

See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:

LAw WITHOUT ORDER

(1973).
14. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2019 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
Title 18 and 28 of the United States Code).
15.

NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES, AND

GUIDELINES 161 (2d ed. 2007).

16.

28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2006).

17.

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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[and avoid] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct." 8
Second, however, the commission sought a system that would "maintain[]
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by
mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment
of general sentencing practices."
1. Pre-Booker Sentencing Mechanics

Under the pre-Booker federal sentencing system, courts took into account the seriousness of the offense and the defendant's criminal history to
establish a sentencing range. More specifically, courts looked to the base
offense level assigned to the crime for which the defendant was convicted;20
the more serious the crime, the higher the base offense level it would carry.
This base offense level was then adjusted depending on the specific characteristics of the crime in question21; these factors could either increase or
decrease the base offense level.22 Courts could then further adjust the offense
level based on various factors, such as "victim-related adjustments, the offender's role in the offense, and obstruction of justice." 23 Finally, the offense
level could be decreased further if the defendant accepted responsibility for
his involvement in the crime.
In addition to determining an offender's offense level, courts assigned
one of six criminal history statuses to defendants, depending on the nature
of any previous convictions and how much time had elapsed since they
occurred.24 The defendant's "guideline range" was then determined by finding the point at which his sentencing level intersected with his criminal
history category on the commission's sentencing table.
A slight sentencing twist applied to defendants deemed by the guidelines to be career offenders. Under USSG § 4B1.1(a), a defendant is a career
offender if:
18.

28 U.S.C. 991(b)(1)(B) (2006).

19.

Id.

20. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
(2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/TRAINING/GLOverviewO4.pdf.
21. "In addition to base offense levels, each offense type typically carries with it a number of
specific offense characteristics." Id. For instance:
One of the specific base offense characteristics for theft (which has a base offense level of 7 if
the statutory maximum is 20 years or more) increases the offense level based on the amount of
loss involved in the offense. If a theft involved a $6,000 loss, there is to be a 2-level increase to
the base offense level, bringing the level up to 9. If a theft involved a $50,000 loss, there is to
be a 6-level increase, bringing the total to 13.
Id.
22.

Id.
23. Id. "Adjustments are factors that can apply to any offense. Like specific offense characteristics, they increase or decrease the offense level." Id. They are distinct from the specific offense
characteristics. See supra note 21.
24.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 20.
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(1)the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant
committed the instant offense of conviction; (2)the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense; and (3)the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.2
If a defendant met these criteria, his criminal history category was au26
tomatically VI, the highest possible.
Under the mandatory federal sentencing system, a sentencing judge had
to issue a sentence that fell within the calculated range unless he felt that
there existed a "circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described."27 In such
a case, the judge could depart from the otherwise applicable sentencing
guideline.
The statute governing sentencing departures imposed procedural restrictions on the ability of sentencing judges to issue departures. The
commission felt it had accounted for offense characteristics that were empirically relevant. Thus, it believed that judges would have little opportunity
to find that the commission failed to account for "a circumstance of kind or
degree"28 that would impact a defendant's sentence. Consequently, the statute required that departing judges list specific reasons for rendering a
sentence that fell outside the presumptive sentencing range.30 Furthermore,
the commission was strict in defining instances in which judges were permitted to depart." This ensured that judges adhered to the governing statute
and issued departures only in extraordinary circumstances, lest they risk

25.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 4Bl.1(a) (2004).

26. USSG § 4B1.1(b) (2004). Additionally, the career-offender defendant's base offense
level was determined by a table found in § 4B 1.1, rather than the table otherwise used for noncareer
offenders. The table found in § 4B 1.1 operated slightly differently than the table used to calculate
the sentences of noncareer offenders. For example, the table found in § 2D1. 1, which is used to
calculate the sentence for noncareer offenders convicted of drug offenses, lists the offense level that
corresponds to a specific amount of a specific drug. For instance, prior to Amendment 706, if a
defendant were found to possess ten grams of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, he would
receive a base offense level of 26, as dictated by the table. The base level offense in § 4B 1.1, conversely, is calculated from the statutory maximum of the offense for which the defendant has been
convicted. For example, if a career-offender defendant were found guilty of possessing ten grams of
crack cocaine, the sentencing judge would first look to the statutory maximum that the offense carried. In this case, it would be forty years. The judge would then consult the table in § 411.1 to
determine what offense level the guidelines would require for a career offender who committed an
offense that carried a statutory maximum of forty years. Here, it would be level 32.
27.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2003).

28.

USSG§

IAl.1(4)(b),

p.s.

29. Id. ("[T]he Commission believes that despite the courts' legal freedom to depart from the
guidelines, they will not do so very often. This is because the guidelines, offense by offense, seek to
take account of those factors that the Commission's sentencing data indicate make a significant
difference in sentencing at the present time.").
30.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).

31.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MANUAL

§5K2.0(2004).
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reversal on appeal.32 Finally, the statute mandated that in issuing departures,
sentencing judges take into account "sentences prescribed by guidelines
applicable to similar offenses and offenders."33
One of the circumstances that most frequently resulted in a downward
departure was when a judge found that the application of the career-offender
guidelines" substantially overstated a defendant's actual criminal history,
which the Sentencing Commission enumerated as an acceptable rationale
for a departure." In that case, the judge would need to take into account the
sentence that the defendant would have received if his sentence were not
determined by the career-offender guidelines but rather by normal sentencing guidelines.
In sum, although the mandatory sentencing system allowed judges to issue "non-guideline" sentences, the substantial restrictions that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the manual placed on judicial discretion made
departures very rare. During the 2005 fiscal year (the last year in which the
guidelines were mandatory), only 4 percent of defendants convicted of drug
trafficking offenses received downward departures that were neither initiated by the government, nor based on the defendant's substantially assisting
the government.
The following three examples help illustrate the operation of the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Example 1. Defendant 1 was found guilty of possessing ten grams of
crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. He has never before committed
any criminal offense. In determining his sentence, the judge first looks to
§ 2D 1.1 in order to determine the base offense level for the crime-in this
case, 26.3 The judge then looks to see if he is eligible for an adjustment in
that offense level. Assume that Defendant 1 is not eligible for any of these
reductions. The judge determines the defendant's criminal history level by
looking to § 4A 1.1. Because Defendant I has no criminal record, his offense
32. See USSG § 1A 1.1, introductory cmt. ("If the court sentences within the guideline range,
an appellate court may [only] review the sentence to determine whether the guidelines were correctly applied. If the court departs from the guideline range, an appellate court may review the
reasonableness of the departure."). This procedural disparity pushed sentencing judges to stay within
sentencing guidelines.

§ 3553(b)(1).

33.

18 U.S.C.

34.

USSG § 4B1.l.

35. USSG § 4Al.3, p.s. ("If reliable information indicates that the defendant's criminal
history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or
the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, a downward departure may be warranted."). According to the Sentencing Commission's data, in 2001, 12.2 percent of all departures
were based on §4Al.3. Of those departures, 36.9 percent were issued to defendants convicted of
drug trafficking offenses. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 47 (2003).
36.

USSG§2DI.1.

37. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl. 27(a) (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data-and_Statistics/Annual_Reportsand.
Sourcebooks/ 2005/table27a pre.pdf
38.

USSG

§2D1.1

(2004).
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level is Level I, the lowest possible." The judge then looks to the sentencing
table to find the sentence range that corresponds to a criminal history level
of I and an offense level of 26: 63-78 months. 0 Finally, if at this point the
judge feels the sentencing guidelines failed to account for circumstances
that were present in this case, he can issue a departure.
Example 2. Defendant 2 was also found guilty of possessing ten grams
of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, but unlike Defendant 1, he was
convicted of two prior drug offenses. These two drug offenses require that
Defendant 2 be treated as a career offender. As a result, the judge, instead of
looking to § 2D 1.1 to determine the defendant's base offense level, looks to
§ 4B 1.1 of the guidelines. He first determines the statutory maximum of the
offense-forty years. He then turns to the table found in § 4B1.1 to determine the defendant's base offense level-32. As with Defendant 1, the judge
looks to see whether the defendant is eligible for any adjustments in sentence as enumerated by the sentencing guidelines. Once again, assume
Defendant 2 is ineligible for any of those adjustments. The judge then determines the defendant's criminal history level-because this defendant
qualifies as a career offender, his offense level is automatically VI, the highest possible one. 4 ' Looking to the table, the judge determines the defendant's
guideline range given an offense level of 32 and a criminal history level of
VI: 210-262 months. At this point, the judge may issue a departure in the
limited circumstances discussed above.
Example 3. Like Defendant 2, Defendant 3 was convicted of possessing
ten grams of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, and has two prior
drug convictions on his record. But Defendant 3 is lucky: his sentencing
judge finds that because the defendant was only a very minor participant in
the previous crimes, the sentence dictated by the career-offender guidelines
overstates the defendant's criminal history. In accordance with § 3553(b)
and § 4A1.3, the judge issues Defendant 3 a departed sentence. Following
the statutory imperative, the judge looks to § 2D 1.1 to determine the analogous sentence that the guidelines prescribe for noncareer offenders. As in
Example 1, the base offense level for a noncareer offender who is found
guilty of distributing ten grams for crack cocaine is 26. The criminal history
level of this noncareer-offender defendant is determined by looking to
§ 4A1.1. Assuming that both of his prior offenses carried a sentence greater
than one year, that he was not on parole when he committed the current offense, and that he committed his previous offenses more than two years
prior to the commission of this offense, 42 Defendant 3 receives a criminal
history level of III. The sentencing table calls for a sentencing range of 7897 months. By completing these steps, the judge sentences Defendant 3-

39.

USSG§4Al.1.

40.

USSG § 5Al.L

4 1.

Id.

42. These specific facts carry no relevance other than that they are necessary to calculate the
defendant's criminal history category.
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who technically could have qualified as a career offender-to a prison term
calculated under the noncareer-offender guidelines.
2. FederalRule of CriminalProcedure 11 Sentences

Sentences issued under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (the "Rules") operate a bit differently.43 Because Rule 11 governs plea
agreements, not trial convictions, courts are precluded from participating in
the initial discussion between the defendant and the prosecutor." The Rules
stipulate that the discussions between the prosecutor and the defendant can
result in three mutually exclusive outcomes. First, the agreement "may specify that an attorney for the government will not bring, or will move to
dismiss, other charges."45 Second, the parties can agree that "an attorney for
the government will . .. recommend, or agree not to oppose the defendant's

request, that a particular sentence or sentencing range is appropriate or that
a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or
sentencing factor does or does not apply."" Third, the parties can agree "that
a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the
case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy
statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply."47
The plea bargain circuit split emerged solely with regard to defendants
who reached plea bargains pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(1)(C). However, the mechanics of Rule 11 (c)(1)(C) are best understood when viewed in contrast to
the mechanics of Rule 1 1(c)(1)(B). The most significant difference between
the second and third possibilities is that when a plea agreement is reached
under Rule 11(c)(1)(B) (the second possibility), even if the court accepts a
plea agreement, it is not bound to the agreed-upon recommendation.48
Further, "the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court
does not follow the recommendation or request." 49 Conversely, when a plea
agreement is reached under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) (the third possibility), the
"recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea
agreement.,"o

43. Rule 11 was amended in 2002 and again in 2007. Many of the defendants whose sentences are implicated by the discussion in this Note were sentenced prior to one or both of these
amendments. The applicable amendments, however, were "intended to be stylistic" and were "not
intended to make any change in practice." FED. R. CiuM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes on 2002
amendment. The most significant effect of the changes was the movement of the applicable language from Rule ll(e)(1)(C) to Rule l l(c)(1)(C). For the sake of clarity, this Note refers to the
Rules as they are currently organized.
44.

FED. R. CRIM. P. I1(c)(1) ("The court must not participate in these discussions.").

45.

Id. Il(c)(1)(A).

46.

Id. I1(c)(1)(B).

47.

Id. ll (c)(1)(C).

48.

Id. I1(c)(1)(B).

49.

Id. I 1(c)(3)(B).

50.

Id. ll (c)(1)(C).
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As such, the Rules appear to afford more leeway in the imposition of
sentences for defendants who plead guilty to an offense than for those who
are convicted of the same offense. Rule 11(c)(1)(C) permits the defendant
and prosecutor to agree to an "appropriate" sentence. However, it is clear
that even in the plea bargain context, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines play a
significant, almost dispositive, role. The guidelines state that in order for a
court to accept a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea bargain, it must be "satisfied either
that the agreed sentence is within the applicable guideline range; or the
agreed sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable
reasons."5' In order to facilitate courts' adherence to this requirement, the
Rules state that the court's approval may explicitly be withheld until it has
had the opportunity to view the defendant's presentence report, which itself
will contain the defendant's recommended guidelines sentence pursuant to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 52 Thus, while the guidelines are certainly
applied less stringently to defendants who strike plea agreements, they are
still the predominant factor in determining a plea bargain defendant's sentence.
3. The Demise of the Mandatory FederalSentencing Regime

Recent Supreme Court decisions have significantly altered the federal
sentencing regime. The first major blow to the mandatory federal sentencing
guidelines was dealt by the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey.5 3 In that case, the Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt."5 4 Although Apprendi dealt with state-issued sentences
rather than the federal guidelines, the decision had major implications for
the federal system because judges, not juries, decide many of the sentencedeterminant factors involved in the federal guidelines. Following up on
Apprendi, the Court held in Blakely v. Washington that, even in mandatory

sentencing regimes, the Sixth Amendment requires juries to find those facts
States v.
that would increase defendants' sentences.55 The Court in United
56
Booker finally ended the mandatory federal sentencing regime. On review,
the Court first held that, because the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are manda51.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

52.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 1I(c)(3)(A).

53.

530 U.S. 466 (2000).

54.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.

§ 6B1.2(c) (2004).

55. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). Apprendi and Blakely stand for
slightly different propositions, though the precise holdings are not significant for the purpose of this
Note. The Court held in Apprendi that a jury must find a fact that increases a defendant's sentencing
range. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466. However, the Court held in Blakely that "the 'statutory maximum'
for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. In other words,
any fact that increases the defendant's sentencing range needs to be proved by a jury.
56.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

March 2011]
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tory, sentence-determinant factfinding by a judge offends the Sixth Amendment.17 Consequently, in a second, remedial holding the Court held that 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b), which rendered the guidelines mandatory, should be "severed and excised" from statute."
The discretionary sentencing system that took form in Booker's wake
was only nominally different than the pre-Booker system in practice. Booker
still required that judges "take account of the Guidelines together with other
sentencing goals" in determining a defendant's sentence." As a result, following Booker, a majority of sentences continued to fall within the nowsuggested range.
Perhaps Booker's most significant impact was the manner in which it
altered the mechanics of the federal sentencing system. As discussed in Section I.A. 1, prior to Booker, judges first identified a defendant's offense and
criminal history levels, then determined the corresponding sentencing range
within the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and finally sentenced the defendant to a prison term within the range dictated by the guidelines. Further, if
a judge wanted to issue a sentence outside of the calculated range, he would
have to first state a specific rationale that the Sentencing Commission had
not accounted for in promulgating the guidelines, then issue a departed sentence that was consistent with (and very often explicitly based on) other
similar guidelines. In effect, this maintained the guise that sentencing judges
were required to calculate a defendant's sentence based on some section of
the Sentencing Guidelines.
Booker obliterated the need to maintain the myth that even reduced sentences were still "within the Federal Guidelines." Instead of issuing
"departures," judges could instead issue variant sentences that simply fell
outside of the range the guidelines recommended for the defendant.6 ' This is
not to suggest that after Booker district court judges have unbridled discretion in sentencing. On the contrary, the guidelines still play a very
significant role: a majority of sentences continue to fall in the suggested
range four years after Booker was decided.62 That being said, the fact that
judges no longer have to consider other similar guidelines sentences in order
to reduce a defendant's sentence impacts this Note's discussion of the crack
amendment.
57.

Id. at 233.

58.

Id. at 260.

59.

Id. at 224.

60. See DEMLEITNER, supra note 15, at 214 (noting that after Booker, nearly 60 percent of all
sentences fell within the guidelines' range).
61.

See id. at 198.

62.

See id. at 214.

63. To be clear, with regards to the career-offender circuit split, post-Booker defendants
could also be affected in virtually the same manner as pre-Booker defendants. The major point that
distinguishes the two classes of defendants is that prior to Booker, judges issuing departures of this
nature were required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) to look to the sentence a defendant would have
received were the defendant not designated a career offender. Thus, these defendants' sentences
were very often explicitly determined as a result of U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
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B. The Crack Amendment

In 1986, after passage of the SRA but before it became completely effective, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 ("ADAA"). 4 One
ostensible goal of the ADAA was to "reflect society's strong view of the
evils of crack cocaine." Most notably, the ADAA established what came to
be known as the "100-to-i" ratio between crack and powder cocaine6: "An
offense involving the mixtures weighing 5 grams or more containing cocaine base was subject to the same punishment as an offense involving
mixtures weighing 500 grams or more containing cocaine powder."67
This massive disparity was based in part on fear and in part on purportedly scientific underpinnings. On the one hand, some of the impetus for the
ADAA was the media's portrayal of crack cocaine as the fuel behind gang
violence, which was rampant in the 1980s.6 In addition to the media's association between crack cocaine and gang violence, crack was perceived by
many to be markedly more dangerous than powder cocaine. The American
Civil Liberties Union noted in its report on the twenty-year anniversary of
the ADAA that the law's "little legislative history" suggested that "Congress
believed that crack was more addictive than powder cocaine, that it caused
crime, that it caused psychosis and death, that young people were particularly prone to becoming addicted to it, and that crack's low cost and ease of
manufacture would lead to even more widespread use of it."69
In the years following the ADAA's passage, many of the assumptions
justifying the sentencing disparity between crack offenses and powder cocaine offenses were discredited. One study published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association found that although there are more severe

consequences when cocaine is smoked (as crack is) or injected, rather than
snorted, "[tjhe physiological and psychoactive effects of cocaine are similar
regardless of whether it is in the form of cocaine hydrochloride [powder
cocaine] or crack cocaine (cocaine base)." 0 Further, the study concluded
that the ADAA's 100-to-I ratio was excessive.
§ 2D1.1 (2004). Post-Bookerjudges now have discretion to issue a variant sentence without making
a requisite reference to § 2D1.l.
64.

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended

at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000)).
65.

Edward J. Perez, et al., Substance Abuse in America: Then and Now, 13 MICH. ST. U. J.

MED. & L. 365, 374 (2009).

66.

Id.
67. DEMLEITNER, supra note 15, at 696; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2004) (proscribing a term of imprisonment of five to forty years for an offense involving five hundred grams of
cocaine or five grams of a crack cocaine).
68. DEMLEITNER, supra note 15, at 696; DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL
CRACK COCAINE LAw

69.

VAGINS

4 (1996).

& MCCURDY, supra note 68, at 2 (internal citations omitted).

70. Dorothy K. Hatsukami & Marian W. Fischman, Crack Cocaine and Cocaine Hydrochloride:Are the Differences Myth or Reality?, 267 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1580 (1996).
7 1.

Id.
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Besides the fact that there was insufficient scientific evidence supporting
the substantial sentencing disparity, there was ample evidence indicating
that African Americans-who tended to use crack cocaine more frequently
than powder cocaine, relative to other groups-were disproportionately affected by the sentencing disparity between offenses involving the two drugs.
To that end, in 2003 African Americans accounted for 80.8 percent of defendants sentenced for federal crack cocaine offenses but only 24.6 percent
of defendants sentenced for federal powder cocaine offenses.7 Because African Americans were disproportionately convicted of crack cocaine
offenses and crack cocaine offenses carried much stiffer punishments than
did powder cocaine offenses, commentators raised concerns over the possible racially discriminatory effects of this sentencing regime.
These factors placed substantial pressure on Congress to amend the
ADAA in order to eliminate, or at least reduce, the 100-to-1 ratio. In 1995,
the U.S. Sentencing Commission recommended to Congress that it change
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to replace the 100-to-i ratio with a 1-to-i
ratio.74 Congress rejected the proposal, requesting a proposal that would not
result in a 1-to-i ratio. 75 In 2002, the Sentencing Commission again condemned the 100-to-i ratio. Specifically, the commission found that:
1)the current penalties exaggerate the relative harmfulness of crack cocaine; 2) the current penalties sweep too broadly and apply most often to
lower level offenders; 3) the current quantity-based penalties overstate the
seriousness of most crack cocaine offenses and fail to provide adequate
proportionality; and 4) the current penalties' severity mostly impacts minorities.76
"Tired of waiting for Congress to act," in 2007 the Sentencing Commission passed an amendment to the federal guidelines to reduce the base
offense level of crack cocaine offenses, found in of U.S.S.G § 2D.1.1, by
two levels." Amendments to the guidelines take effect 180 days after submission to Congress "except to the extent that the effective date is revised or
the amendment is otherwise modified or disapproved by Act of Congress."
As such, when Congress failed to act on the commission's proposal, the
crack amendment took effect. Further, in late 2007, the commission voted to
apply the crack amendment retroactively. When Congress again neglected to
72. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
RACE OF DRUG OFFENDERS FOR EACH TYPE OF DRUG (2003).
73.

VAGINS & MCCURDY,

SENTENCING, TABLE

34:

supra note 68, at i.

74. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25076
(May 10, 1995).
75. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, and Official Commentary,
Pub L. No 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (1995).
76. VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 68, at 6 (citing to U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (2002)).
77. Chris Gaspard, Kimbrough and Gall: Taking Another "Crack" at Expanding Judicial
Discretion Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 757, 764 (2009).
78.

28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006); see also Stout, supra note 3.
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modify or reject the commission's resolution, the crack amendment became
retroactive.
II. THE

CAREER-OFFENDER CIRCUIT SPLIT

The federal circuits are split as to whether defendants who were eligible
to be sentenced as career criminals under § 4B 1.1 but whose sentencing
judges departed below the applicable guideline range after finding that the
criminal enhancement overstated the defendants' actual criminal history
("nominal career offenders"), are eligible for a reduction in sentence pursuant to the crack amendment. The Second Circuit has held that nominal
career offenders are eligible for such a reduction; in contrast, the First,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have found that they are ineligible. Below, Section II.A discusses the application of the amendment to the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines and provides background on the split. Section II.B explains how
the plain language of the Sentencing Commission's policy statement shows
that, as the First, Eight, and Tenth Circuits have held, nominal career offenders should be found ineligible for a sentence reduction under the crack
amendment. Section II.C concludes that the Sentencing Commission intended to exclude career offenders from the benefits of the crack
amendment and explains the commission's probable motivation. Finally,
Section II.D discusses the tension between the plain language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) and USSG § 1B1.10(a)(1) and the goals underlying the crack
amendment.
A. Applying the Crack Amendment to the FederalSentencing Guidelines

In passing the crack amendment, all the U.S. Sentencing Commission
technically did was amend the drug/offense table found in USSG § 2D. 1.1.
Sentencing judges use that table to initially determine a defendant's criminal
offense level.80 The crack amendment reduced by two a defendant's offense
level for possessing a certain quantity of crack cocaine. In current cases, the
application of the crack amendment is straightforward: to determine a defendant's base offense level as a starting point, a judge simply looks to the
table.
In the case of retroactive sentences, though, the sentencing mechanism
is not so straightforward. The statute that governs reduction in sentencing
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines reads, in relevant part:
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered
by the Sentencing Commission ... the court may reduce the term of im-

prisonment .. .to the extent that [the amendments] are applicable, if such a

79.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C supp., amend. 713 (Mar. 3,2008).

80.

See Examples 1-3, supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission."
The policy statement accompanying that provision states that "in a case in
which a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline
range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result
of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual ... the court may reduce the

defendant's term of imprisonment as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).""
Despite the somewhat complicated machinery, the statutory language
has generally been applied without controversy in cases related to the crack
amendment. Courts agree that defendants who were sentenced as career
offenders under § 4B31.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines (Defendant 2 in the
example above") are not eligible for a reduction of sentence.8 That is, because these defendants' sentences were not "based on" § 2D1.1, but rather
on § 4Bl.1-unimpacted by the crack amendment-the language of
§ 3582(c)(2) excludes these defendants from the benefits of the amendment.
Similarly, courts agree that defendants who were strictly sentenced under
§ 2D1.1 prior to the passage of the crack amendment (Defendant 1 in the
example above") are entitled to a reduction in their sentence commensurate
with a two-level reduction in their base offense level. In other words,
because these defendants' sentences were "based [solely] on" § 2D1.1-a
sentencing range that was amended by the U.S. Sentencing Commissioncourts have found that these defendants are eligible for a subsequent
reduction in sentence under the crack amendment.
The circuit split centers on defendants who were not clearly sentenced
under either § 4B1.1 or § 2D1.1, but rather under a combination of the two
(Defendant 3 in the example above 6 ). Recall that the wording of
§ 3582(c)(2) and the Sentencing Commission's corresponding policy statement require that relevant defendants' sentences be "based on" § 2D1.1 in
order for them to be eligible for a reduction of their sentence after the crack
amendment. Defendants in these cases were eligible to be sentenced under
§ 4B 1.1, and in some sense, § 4B 1.1 provided a starting point for the sentencing judge. On the other hand, it is clear that in at least some cases the
defendants' ultimate sentences were determined exclusively by the sentencing ranges found in § 2D1.1.
At first glance, these cases present a perplexing question without a clear
answer. As it turns out, however, despite the fairness-based appeal of its

81.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added).

82.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §I

83.

See supra Section I.A.1.

BI.10(a)(1) (2009)

(emphasis added).

84. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United
States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6 (1st Cir.
2008).
85.

See supra Section I.A.1.

86.

See supra Section I.A.1.
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argument, the Second Circuit's decision is not only at odds with the other
circuits but also with the plain language of § 3582(c)(2) and § 1B 1.10.
B. Courts Should Not Find Nominal CareerOffenders Eligiblefor
a Reduction in Sentence Pursuantto the Crack Amendment

According to the plain language of § 3582(c)(2) and § 1B 1.10, there is a
clear resolution to this seemingly complex issue. Further, the accompanying
policy statement, USSG § lB 1.10, states that "[i]n a case in which a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable
to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual ... the court may reduce the defendant's
term of imprisonment as provided by 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2).""
Ultimately, the issue of whether or not nominal career offenders are eligible for sentence reduction pursuant to the crack amendment hinges on
whether the "guidelines range applicable to the defendant" discussed in
§ 11.1O is the defendant's pre-departure or post-departure range. If the
"guidelines range applicable to the defendant" is the pre-departure rangefor nominal career offenders, the sentence calculated under § 4B1.1-then
nominal career offenders are not eligible for a reduction in sentence because
the applicable guidelines range will not have been altered by the crack
amendment. If, however, the "guidelines range applicable to the defendant"
is the post-departure range-for nominal career offenders, the range calculated through reference to § 2D1.1-then nominal career offenders may be
eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the amendment.
The Second Circuit found in United States v. McGee that the "applicable
guidelines range" is the defendants' post-departure range." The court noted
that the language of the statute does "not preclude the possibility that a defendant who was, even if by virtue of a departure, sentenced 'based on' the
crack guidelines would be eligible for a reduction."" Further, the court
noted:
[G]iven that the policy statement is subject to different interpretations and
taking account of case law as well as the purposes of the crack amendments, . . . the policy statement would permit a defendant whose postdeparture sentence was . . . explicitly based on the crack cocaine guidelines
to request a reduced sentence pursuant to Amendment 706 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). 0

The underlying appeal of this holding was the fact that if the amendment
had taken place before the defendant had been sentenced, "it is likely that

87.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IB1.10(a)(1) (2008) (emphasis added).

88.

553 F.3d 225, 228-30 (2d Cir. 2009).

89.

McGee, 553 F.3d at 228.

90.

Id.
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the district court would have given [him] a sentence within the now reduced
guideline range . . . ."9

While the Second Circuit's reading of the statute and the accompanying
policy statement seems persuasive from a fairness standpoint, it overlooks
the Sentencing Commission's own definition of a nominal career offender's
applicable guidelines range. The biggest indication that the commission
intended the "applicable guidelines range" to mean the defendant's predeparture range appears in the definition of "departure" within the manual:
"Departure" means (i) for purposes other than those specified in subdivision (ii), imposition of a sentence outside the applicable guideline range or
of a sentence that is otherwise different from the guideline sentence; and
(ii) for purposes of § 4A1.3 (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal
History Category), assignment of a criminal history category other than the
otherwise applicable criminal history category, in order to effect a sentence
outside the applicable guideline range.9
In the course of defining "departure," the commission assumed that a defendant's "applicable guideline range" was his pre-departure guideline
range. Given that a nominal career offender necessarily received a departure,
it is very hard to imagine that the Sentencing Commission intended the
"applicable guideline range" referenced in the definition of a departure to be
distinct from the "guideline range applicable to the defendant" referenced in
§ B1.10. Many other circuit courts have adopted this reasoning, disagreeing with the Second Circuit."
The argument is further bolstered by the sentencing instructions found in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which direct judges to follow a five-step
process:
(1) Determine the defendant's offense guideline section;
(2) Determine the base offense level and appropriate offense characteristics;
(3) Apply appropriate adjustments related to victim, role, and obstruction
of justice;
(4) Apply the appropriate "acceptance of responsibility" adjustment; and

91.

Id. at 227.

92.

USSG § lB1.1 cmt. n.1(E).

93. See United States v. Darton, 595 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that "[bjecause
the guidelines 'effectively define all departures to be outside the "applicable guideline range,'" an
amendment that lowers only the post-departure sentencing range does not provide a basis for a
defendant's motion for sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2)") (internal citations omitted); United
States v. Tolliver, 570 F.3d t062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2009) (defining a departure as the "imposition of a
sentence outside the applicable guideline range or of a sentence that is otherwise different from the
guideline sentence") (quoting USSG § IB1. 1 cmt. n.1(E) (2008)); see also United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying the same logic to a defendant who was sentenced
after Booker, noting "a variance is granted in the sentencing court's discretion after the court has
established an appropriately calculated guideline sentencing range. It is that sentencing range that
must be lowered by an amendment in order to engage the gears of section 3582(c)(2)") (intemal
citations omitted).
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(5) Determine the defendant's criminal history category, including any applicable career enhancements. 94
After that, the manual instructs judges to "[d]etermine the guideline
range ... that corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category
determined above." 5 Further, the sentencing manual instructs judges to determine "the sentencing requirements and options related to probation,
imprisonment, supervision conditions, fines, and restitution," given the "particular guideline range."9 Finally, it directs judges to look to "Specific
Offender Characteristics and Departures, and to any other policy statements
or commentary in the guidelines that might warrant consideration in imposing sentence."9 In other words, the sentencing instructions twice mention a
defendant's "guideline range" in reference to his pre-departure guideline
98
range.
Thus, a close inspection of the federal guidelines necessitates the conclusion that the "guidelines range applicable to the defendant" mentioned in
§ 1B1.10 is a defendant's pre-departure range. Although the Second Circuit
approach seems fair, the focus of the other circuits on the plain language of
the statute is more persuasive. As such, in accordance with the history and
plain language of § 3582(c)(2), nominal career offenders who were convicted of crack offenses prior to the passage of the crack amendment should
be ineligible to receive its benefits.
C. The Exclusion of Nominal CareerOffenders from the Benefits
of the Crack Amendment Was Not an Oversight

The language of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines appears to preclude
nominal career offenders from the benefit of retroactive application of the
crack amendment. While it does not necessarily follow that this exclusion
was thoroughly contemplated, the actions of the Sentencing Commission
around the time of the crack amendment's passage reveal that it almost certainly was. The Sentencing Commission's own analysis indicates that it
anticipated that nominal career offenders would be excluded from the benefits of the amendment. It further indicates that the commission amended
§ 1131.10 so as to eliminate language that could have been interpreted in
these defendants' favor.
First, there was a fair amount of hostility toward the idea of rendering
the crack amendment retroactive at all, let alone applying it to nominal career offenders. Prior to the retroactive application of the crack amendment

94.

USSG § IBl.1(a)-(f).

95.

Id. § 1B1.1(g).

96.

Id. § IBl.1(h).

97.

Id. § IB1 .1(i).

98.

Tolliver, 570 F.3d at 1065-66; see also Darton, 595 F.3d at 1196.
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and in response to a report" by the U.S. Sentencing Commission on the implications of such application, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued a
twelve-page letter urging the commission not to apply the amendment retroactively.'tm One of its main arguments was that if the crack amendment were
applied retroactively, "[m]any of the prisoners eligible for immediate release
... [would] be among the most serious and often violent offenders in the
federal system."'o' The DOJ buttressed this point by noting that defendants
with the highest criminal offense levels were eligible for the largest potential
decrease in the length of sentence.'" Further, roughly two-thirds of the defendants who would be eligible for a reduced sentence with retroactive
application of the crack amendment had a Level III criminal history or
greater.03 The commission's own findings had indicated that defendants
with higher offense levels are more likely to reoffend,'"' and the DOJ argued
that in rendering the crack amendment retroactive, the commission would be
putting the most dangerous crack dealers back on the street.'os Since the
Sentencing Commission had such difficulty passing the crack amendment,
there is ample reason to believe the commission feared that, if nominal career offenders were eligible for a reduction in sentence, Congress would not
allow the crack amendment to be applied retroactively.'o
Further, there is evidence that the Sentencing Commission in fact acted
on that fear. The first indication that the commission intended to exclude
nominal career offenders appears in the legislative history of § 1B 1.10. The
purpose of § 1B1.10 is to guide judges in reducing defendants' sentences
99.

GLENN SCHMITT ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE CRACK COCAINE AMEND-

MENT IF MADE RETROACTIVE

(2007).

100. Letter from Alice Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Hon. Ricardo H. Hinojosa, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Nov. 1, 2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
pubcomRetro/PC20071 1_001.pdf.
101.

Id.at6.

102. Id. at 7. This is because of the nature of the sentencing tables, and because the retroactive
sentence reduction applies to those defendants currently incarcerated. Those with longer sentences
are naturally more likely to still be in prison than those defendants who, due to lower career guidelines ranges, were given shorter sentences.
103.
104.
TATION

Id.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUOF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/

publicat/RecidivismGeneral.pdf.
105.

Letter from Alice Fisher, supra note 100.

106. See supra Section I.B. Again, Congress twice rejected the commission's proposed
amendments, and ultimately, Amendment 706 was passed only after the commission acted unilaterally and Congress failed to take action.
107. As was briefly discussed above, after the U.S. Sentencing Commission promulgates an
amendment, the amendment can take effect as soon as 180 days later unless Congress affirmatively
rejects or modifies the amendment. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. In addition, the statute requires that the commission include "a statement of the reasons" supporting the enactment of
the given amendment. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006). Congress's failure to modify or reject the amendment that resulted in the retroactive application of the initial crack amendment, then, indicates that
Congress tacitly approved of its passing. However, because of the guidelines' amendment process,
the legislative history is found in the commission's, rather than Congress's, actions.

804

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 109:785

pursuant to retroactive changes to the guidelines. The commission amended
§ 11B1.10 to take effect on March 3, 2008'0s-the same day on which the
crack amendment was to become retroactive-and in its amended form, it
became decidedly less favorable to nominal career offenders. The preamendment policy statement read:
In determining whether, and to what extent, a reduction in the term of imprisonment is warranted for a defendant eligible for consideration under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the court should consider the term of imprisonment
that it would have imposed had the amendment(s) to the guidelines listed
in subsection (c) been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced . . . ."

Under this formulation, it could be argued that nominal career offenders are
eligible for a reduction in sentence under the crack amendment, reasoning
that a judge would have imposed on them a lower sentence had the crack
amendment been in effect at sentencing. The revised statement, however,
states:
In determining whether, and to what extent, a reduction in the defendant's
term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement is warranted, the court shall determine the amended guideline range
that would have been applicable to the defendant if the amendment(s) to
the guidelines listed in subsection (c) had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced." 0
This revised formulation is much stronger than the previous iteration.
Also, as previously noted, the post-amendment language does away with
any ambiguity that could be construed in favor of nominal career offenders.
Finally, the commission's own "Impact Analysis"-prospectively summarizing the effects of rendering the crack amendment retroactive-seems
to indicate that it anticipated that nominal career offenders would not be
eligible for a reduction. In that document, the commission discussed the
group of currently incarcerated defendants who would be affected by making the crack amendment retroactive. In defining that group, the commission
noted that those defendants "whose original final offense level was controlled by the career offender or armed career criminal sections of the
guidelines" would be excluded from the benefits of the amendment's retro-

108.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2007 GUIDELINES MANUAL (2008).

109.

U.S.

110.

USSG § IB1.10 (2009) (effective Mar. 3, 2008).

SENTENCING

GUIDELINES MANUAL §

1B 1.10(b)

(2007) (effective June 15, 1988).

Ill. This Note finds the political motivation more compelling than the official explanation,
which was simply that the amendment was enacted "to clarify the limitations on the extent to which
a court may reduce the defendant's term of imprisonment." Notice of Final Action Regarding
Amendments to Policy Statement § IB1.10, 73 Fed. Reg. 217, 219 (Jan. 2, 2008). That is, it appears
from this history that the commission rightfully feared that if not for steps that would explicitly
exclude nominal career offenders from the benefits of the retroactive application of the crack
amendment, Congress would not have allowed the retroactive application of the amendment at all.
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active application."12 Although that sentence is slightly ambiguous, it seems
that the commission's use of the term "original final offense level," rather
than simply "final offense level," indicates the commission anticipated the
exclusion of nominal career offenders from the benefits of the retroactive
application of the crack amendment
D. The Exclusion of Nominal CareerOffenders Conflicts with
the Goals of the Crack Amendment

Although it is contrary to the spirit of the crack amendment to do so,
courts can prudently find that nominal career offenders are excluded from
the benefits of the amendment. First, such an exclusion would be consistent
with the plain language of § 3582(c)(2) and its accompanying policy statement, § 1B1.10. Furthermore, a study of the U.S. Sentencing commission's
activity when the amendment was made retroactive indicates that the Commission was not only aware of their exclusion, but that it in fact intended it.
In light of this, the Second Circuit's McGee decision is incorrect. And while
it appears as though the U.S. Sentencing Commission excluded nominal
career offenders from the benefits of the crack amendment in order to ensure
that Congress would allow its retroactive application to other defendants,
this Note argues that nominal career offenders ought to realize those benefits as well.
The Second Circuit's decision was grounded in a belief in equity. The
Sentencing Commission desired that noncareer offenders who were sentenced under the prejudicial guidelines have a remedial recourse.
Furthermore, the commission created a mechanism that allowed judges,
even during the mandatory sentencing regime, to depart from the careeroffender guidelines if the guidelines overstated a defendant's criminal history. Because of the mandatory regime, when the judge departed from those
guidelines, he would when possible ground his departed sentence on another
guideline. And inevitably in the case of defendants convicted of a crackcocaine offense, that other guideline would be determined by referencing
the table found in § 2D1.1. This was the very table the commission amended
to provide recourse to those defendants disadvantaged by the prejudicial gap
in sentences between crack and powder cocaine. As a result, these defendants were affected by the fact that crack cocaine offenses carried much
higher sentences than those involving powdered cocaine.
Despite this paradox, as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are presently
constructed, these defendants are not entitled to benefit from the very
amendment that was enacted to benefit defendants who were disadvantaged
by the draconian crack cocaine sentencing guidelines. However, because
§ 3582(c)(2) and § 1B 1.10 do not explicitly exclude some defendants whose
sentences were instituted through plea bargains from the benefits of the
crack amendments, this line of logic is more persuasive in that context-the
focus of the next Part.
112.

SCHMITT ET AL., supra note

99, at n.19.
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THE PLEA BARGAIN CIRCUIT SPLIT

In many respects, the defendants involved in the plea bargain circuit
split are similar to the nominal career offenders discussed above. Like the
nominal career offenders, it is likely that, had the crack amendment been in
place when they were sentenced, these defendants would have received
shorter sentences. Like nominal career offenders, a large subset of these
defendants are still not eligible for a sentence reduction under the retroactive
application of the crack amendment. In contrast, however, a very small subset is eligible and entitled to such a reduction."'
As discussed in Section II.C, the U.S. Sentencing Commission apparently purposefully excluded nominal career offenders from the benefits of
the crack amendment. Furthermore, it appears that the commission's decision to exclude these defendants had a plausible political motivation.
However, there is no evidence that Congress intended to exclude plea bargain defendants like the defendant in United States v. Cobb from the
benefits of the crack amendment. Furthermore, the DOJ noted, while nominal career offenders are more often serious criminals than noncareer
offenders, there is no evidence that this holds true for plea bargain defendants like Mr. Cobb. Given that so many similarly situated, similarly
deserving defendants have been arbitrarily precluded from reduced sentences, it is both fair and legally proper that these defendants realize the
benefits of the retroactive application of the crack amendment.
A. The Basis of the CircuitSplit

As discussed in Section I.A.2, plea bargains enforced through Rule
11(c)(1)(C) are unique in that, if the court accepts the plea bargain agreed
upon pursuant to that rule, the court has no discretion to alter the sentence.
However, prior to accepting or rejecting the plea deal, a court has the express option of looking at the defendant's presentencing report in order to
determine whether the stipulated sentence is in accordance with (or justifiably different than) the default sentence provided by the federal guidelines." 4
Further, Rule 11(c)(1)(C) states that the prosecutor and the defendant may
"agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing
Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply.""5 In other words, it is entirely possible-even encouraged-for the
parties striking the plea to agree to a sentence explicitly calculated according to guidelines.
113. The defendant in United States v. Cobb, 584 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009), is representative
of this subset. See infra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
114. The 1998 Federal Guidelines Manual indicates that the court may accept a Rule
1I(c)(1)(C) agreement if "(1) the agreed sentence is within the applicable guideline range; or (2) the
agreed sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons." U.S. SENTENC-

§ 611.2

ING GUIDELINES MANUAL
115.

FED. R. CRIM.

P.

(1998) (amended 2003).

11(c)(1)(C).
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While not all circuits have addressed this question in the context of the
crack amendment, there is a strong consensus among one federal appellate
camp"'6 that when a sentence is determined through Rule 11 (c)(1)(C), the
district courts lack discretion to reduce the defendant's sentence pursuant to
§ 3582(c)(2) absent an explicit agreement between the prosecutor and the
defendant to amend the sentence in the event of an amendment to the applicable guidelines range."' These courts reason that plea bargains granted
under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) are binding on the district court if it chooses to accept it."' Further, these courts hold that a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea bargain is a
contract between the defendant and the prosecutor, a contract that "binds the
court once the court accepts the plea agreement."" 9 Thus, these courts hold
that "the plain language of the current version of . . . Rule 11(c)(1)(C), generally precludes the district court from altering the parties' agreed sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). This conclusion applies despite the retroactivity
of a subsequent amendment to a relevant guideline utilized to determine the
defendant's sentence." 20
A second group of circuit courts,12 also utilizing the contract theory of
plea bargaining, is less absolute in its treatment of Rule 11(c)(1)(C) pleas.
Similar to those in the first camp, courts in this group hold that a defendant
sentenced pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) may be eligible for a subsequent
reduction in sentence only if he makes clear his "intent that his sentence be
adjusted in tandem with any future adjustment in the Guidelines." 22 In accordance with these principles, these courts have held or at least suggested
that defendants who reached a plea bargain pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
with a sentence that fell below their federal guidelines range were barred
from arguing that they intended that their sentence be reduced in the event
of a subsequent amendment to the sentencing guideline under which they
would have been sentenced. None of the courts in this group have found a
defendant eligible for a subsequent sentence reduction pursuant to the crack
amendment. However, they have held open the possibility that, if a defendant's plea bargained sentence were calculated under a later-amended

116.

The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.

117. See United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2009) (Rendell, J., concurring); United States v. Peveler, 539 E3d 369, 379 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Brown, 71 F.
App'x. 383, 383 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. McKenna, 134 F.3d 380, 380 (9th Cir. 1998).
118.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(c)(1)(C); see, e.g., Peveler, 359 E3d at 378-79.

119.

FED. R. CRIM. P. I1(c)(1)(C); see, e.g., Peveler, 359 E3d at 375.

120.

Peveler, 359 E3d at 379.

121.

The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits.

122. United States v. Ray, 598 F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Green,
595 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 2010) ("In general, plea agreements are construed according to contract
law principles.") (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Yemitan, 70 E3d 746, 747 (2d Cir.
1995)); United States v. Scurlark, 560 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2009) ("The circumstances surrounding this Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement demonstrate the contractual nature of the agreement and
the fact that the sentence was not based on a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered.").
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guideline range and were to fall within his applicable sentencing guideline
range, he could be eligible for a reduction pursuant to the amendment.'
Finally, however, in United States v. Cobb the Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected the contract theory argument and held that the "reasonable
interpretation" of § 3582(c)(2) necessitated the conclusion that some Rule
11 (c)(1)(C) defendants were eligible for a reduction in sentence under the
crack amendment.124 Specifically, the court noted that:
Congress did not intend to keep negotiated plea agreements (even those
specifying a particular sentence within a properly computed guideline
range) from the reach of § 3582. In § 3582(c)(2), Congress merely used
the language "based upon a qualifying sentencing range." The statute imposes no requirement that to be based on a qualifying range, the sentence
be a non-negotiated, "run-of-the-mill" guideline sentence. Instead, it generally allows for reductions of sentences which are based in any way on a
qualifying range. No other connection is required.
In light of the Tenth Circuit's previous decision in United States v. Trujeque,126 it is clear that Cobb is restricted to those defendants who were
sentenced in accordance with their applicable guidelines range.
B. Cobb Defendants Should Be Eligiblefor Sentence
Reductions Under the Crack Amendment
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Cobb has all of the fairness-based appeal
of the Second Circuit's holding in McGee without any of its legal shortcomings. 12 As was the case in McGee, it is exceedingly clear that the
defendant's sentence in Cobb was determined exclusively by the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines-§ 2D1.1 in particular. As the Cobb court noted, the
123. Ray, 598 F3d at 410 ("The Tenth Circuit case may arguably be said to have found that
the intent of the plea agreement was to tie the sentence to the Guidelines range, which was moved.
Such is clearly not the case with respect to [the defendant], whose plea agreement draws no connection between the agreed-to sentence and the relevant Guidelines range."); United States v. Main, 579
F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[W]e need not address whether [Rule 1(c)(1)(C)] should be construed in other cases to bar resentencing pursuant to section 3582(c)(2)."); Scurlark, 560 F.3d at 842
("The circumstances surrounding this Rule ll(c)(1)(C) plea agreement demonstrate the contractual
nature of the agreement and the fact that the sentence was not based on a sentencing range that was
subsequently lowered."). While the Second Circuit itself has not found a plea bargain defendant
eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the crack amendment, a district court within the Second
Circuit has. United States v. Fruster, 669 F Supp. 2d 341 (W.D.N.Y 2009).
124.

584 F.3d 979, 985 (10th Cir. 2009).

125. Id. at 985. The Fourth Circuit has made an almost identical finding. See United States v.
Dews, 551 F.3d 204, 211 (4th Cir. 2008) ("The statute does not state that a sentence imposed consistent with a plea agreement cannot be 'based on a sentencing range,' nor does it state that the
sentencing range must be the sole basis of the sentence. To conclude otherwise would require adding words to the statute, a task in the province of the legislature and not the judiciary."). However,
Dews was granted an en banc rehearing and was rendered moot before the rehearing occurred. Id.,
reh'g en banc granted (Feb. 20, 2009), vacated as moot (May 4, 2009).
126. 100 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that a defendant who agreed to a plea bargained
sentence below his applicable guidelines range was ineligible for a reduction in sentence pursuant to
a retroactive change in his applicable guidelines).
127.

See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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parties "stipulated that sentencing would be 'determined by application of
the sentencing guidelines.' The agreement also noted that the stipulated sentence of 168 months was 'the bottom of the applicable guideline range.' ,2s
Further, the sentencing court agreed with the parties' calculations and imposed a sentence of 168 months because it found "there was 'no reason to
depart from the Guideline range.' ,129
Despite the fact that the defendant's sentence in Cobb was clearly calculated under § 2D1.1, courts on the other side of the circuit split would more
than likely find him ineligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the crack
amendment. The argument would be that because a plea bargain is a contract, both sides make concessions: "Defendants plead guilty in return for
important sentencing concessions. Prosecutors make concessions in return
for substantial savings in time and energy and the elimination of the risk of
acquittal.,, 3 0 By agreeing to a plea bargain (which presumably comes with a
lighter sentence), defendants like the one in Cobb negotiate away the option
to have "a sentence not based on the Rule 11(e) plea but on a 'sentencing
range,'" absent some express agreement to the contrary.13 1
With regards to defendants who reach a plea agreement below their otherwise applicable guidelines range, this theory makes perfect sense. By
accepting a sub-guidelines sentence, these defendants willingly cut the cord
between themselves and the sentencing guidelines. Despite the fact that their
ultimate sentence likely would have been lower had the crack amendment
been in place when they were negotiating the plea bargain, these defendants
received a benefit (a sub-guideline sentence) in return for adequate consideration (a waiver of § 3582(c)(2) claims).132
However, with defendants like the one in Cobb, the contract theory falls
apart. Cobb and the prosecutor had agreed that Cobb's sentence would be
determined by the sentencing guidelines-in his case, § 2D 1.1.13 The court
applied independent analysis and confirmed that the party's agreement
properly calculated Cobb's sentence under the applicable sentencing guidelines.134 Because Cobb was sentenced under the pre-Booker mandatory
sentencing framework, he was sentenced to a range within which, absent
extraordinary circumstances, the court was obligated to sentence him.3 5 It is
128.

Cobb, 584 F.3d at 981 (citation omitted).

129.

Id. at 981-82.

130. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101
1926 (1992).
131.

YALE

L.J. 1909,

See United States v. Dews, 551 F.3d 204, 215 (4th Cir. 2008) (Agee, J., dissenting).

132. Put another way, for defendants who agree to a sub-guidelines sentence through a plea
bargain, the fact that these defendants will be ineligible for a subsequent sentence reduction in the
event of an amendment to the applicable guidelines range can be viewed as a default term of their
contract. Thus, only an agreement to the contrary would afford them the benefits of subsequent
amendments to the sentencing guidelines. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
133.

Cobb, 584 F.3d at 981-82.

134.

Id. at 981.

135. See generally supra Section I.A. It is true of course that Cobb was sentenced on the
lowest end of the range of sentences he was eligible to receive.
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disingenuous to argue that in the process of bargaining for this sentence,
Cobb negotiated away the right to argue that his sentence was based on the
sentencing guidelines. In contract terms, such a bargain would be illusory.3 6
The courts in Cobb and United States v. Dews both dismissed the contract theory in favor of a statutory interpretation.1 7 Specifically, those courts
noted that Congress made no indication that, for defendants to be eligible
for a subsequent reduction in sentence pursuant to § 3582, sentences should
be based on "a non-negotiated, 'run-of-the-mill' guideline sentence."'
Technically, this is true. However, for circuits with a history of treating sentences arrived at through Rule 11(c)(1)(C) pleas as being "based on" the
plea agreement and not the sentencing guidelines, the contractual theory
discussed above provides a theoretical justification for making an exception
for this small subset of defendants whose negotiated sentences were calculated through and fell within their applicable guideline range.
In light of the Federal Sentencing Commission's intention in enacting
the crack amendment, this theoretical hook should be all that is necessary to
justify extending the benefits of the amendment to these defendants. As has
been discussed, the crack amendment marked a long-overdue change to a
sentencing regime that drastically overpunished crack offenders relative to
their peers. Because this area of sentencing law was such a highly politi136. This argument could also be framed in the manner the Seventh Circuit alluded to in Ray.
See United States v. Ray, 598 F.3d 407, 410 (2010). That is, by agreeing to a sentence calculated by
and falling within his applicable guideline range, Cobb implicitly contracted to have his sentence
tied to a specific range, thereby making him eligible for a reduction in sentence in the event of an
amendment to that range. The theoretical difference between the argument advanced in this Section
and the argument advanced in Ray is that when a defendant agrees in a plea bargain to a sentence
calculated by and falling within the applicable federal guidelines range, this Note treats that defendant's future eligibility for a subsequent reduction in sentence pursuant to a retroactive amendment
of that range as a "default term" of the plea bargain contract. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87 (1989) (introducing the theory of penalty defaults and analyzing the concept of default rules
generally); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). With future sentence-reduction eligibility as a default term,
the defendant and the prosecutor would have to explicitly agree to alter it for the defendant to be
ineligible for such a reduction. See Ayres & Gertner, supra, at 87 ("Default rules fill the gaps in
incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them."). Ray treated all defendants' ineligibility for such a reduction as a default term. 598 F.3d at 410 ("Only if an intent to
modify is apparent at the time of the agreement is the sentence modifiable since the issue is one of
contract principle."). The Seventh Circuit's dictum implied that defendants who agree to sentences
that fall within their applicable guidelines range have intended to tie their sentence to the guidelines.
In other words, they contracted around their default ineligibility.
This distinction should prove inconsequential in practice. Regardless of which analysis is applied, the end result is the same, so long as courts using the Seventh Circuit's framework find that
the parties contracted around the default term in all instances in which the defendant was issued a
sentence calculated by and falling within his applicable guidelines range.
137. Cobb, 584 F.3d at 984-85 ("Importing contract ideas into our assessment
of § 3582 would hinder adequate consideration of Defendant's perfectly logical analysis and misdirect our focus from the reasonable interpretation that Congress did not intend to keep negotiated
plea agreements (even those specifying a particular sentence within a properly computed guideline
range) from the reach of § 3582."); United States v. Dews, 551 F.3d 204, 211 (4th Cir. 2009) ("In
this circumstance, there is no reason in principle or in the language of Rule 1 1(e)(1)(C) that precludes a future application of § 3582(c)(2) in an appropriate case.").
138.

Cobb, 584 F.3d at 985.
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cized realm, however, the Sentencing Commission was forced to make a
certain number of concessions, including the exclusion of nominal career
offenders from the benefits of the amendment. Unlike the case with nominal
career offenders, however, there is nothing in the statutory history that indicates that the sentencing commission intended to exclude defendants
receiving § 2D1.1 plea bargain sentences from the benefits of the crack
amendment. It is clear that the commission would have been willing to resolve ambiguous language to make its intentions clear. However, with
regard to these defendants, the commission took no such action. Therefore,
as the Tenth Circuit noted:
Barring [all] defendants who enter Rule 11 pleas from pursuing sentence
modifications under § 3582 tends to undermine this general pattern and ignore the pervasiveness of pleas. It also undervalues the role of the
guidelines in determining the negotiable range in plea agreements. ... If
we categorically removed Rule 11 pleas from the reach of § 3582, it would
perpetuate the very disparity § 3582 and the retroactive application of
Amendment 706 were meant to correct. Such an approach would leave defendants who pled guilty before the effective date of the amendment with
higher sentences than those who pled guilty afterward because the postamendment pleas and plea negotiations are based on the lower, modified
sentencing ranges. Therefore, all defendants who entered Rule 11 pleas before the effective date of the amendment would be left serving greater
sentences on the now-rejected grounds of the 100-to-1 powder-to-crack
cocaine ratio. 3 9
Thus, in light of the legal arguments summarized by the Tenth Circuit
and the fact that the Federal Sentencing Commission clearly did not contemplate excluding defendants like Cobb from the benefits -of the crack
amendment, courts should find this subset of defendants eligible for a retroactive reduction in their sentences.
CONCLUSION
In the two years since the crack amendment became retroactive, more
than 15,000 defendants have had their sentences reduced pursuant to the
change in law.'4 These sentence reductions have, on average, shaved more
than two years off the sentences of eligible defendants.141 While there still
exists a disparity between crack and cocaine sentences under federal law, the
disparity is not nearly as egregious as it was prior to the passage of the
amendment. But despite the progress that has been made, there are still a
number of defendants who ought to be eligible for a sentence reduction in
light of these amendment, but who have been largely excluded.

139.

Id. at 985.

140.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY CRACK COCAINE RETROACTIVITY DATA

PORT tbl. 2 (2010).

141.

Id. at tbl. 8.
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The justifications for excluding nominal career defendants from the benefits of the retroactive crack amendment are fairly sound. These defendants
have considerable criminal histories. As a result, they have statistically
higher recidivism rates, militating against reducing their sentences. More
significantly, nominal career defendants appear to have been purposely excluded from the benefits of the retroactive application of the crack
amendment by the Federal Sentencing Commission. Because crack cocaine
sentencing has long been such a divisive issue, it looks as though the commission took active steps to ensure that those defendants would not receive
the benefits of the amendment. In light of this fact and given the clarity of
the statutory language that a majority of courts have interpreted to exclude
nominal career offenders from the benefits of amendment, those defendants'
exclusion appears neither haphazard nor exceedingly unfair.
However, the exclusion of defendants like Cobb-defendants who received plea bargained sentences that were explicitly and exclusively based
on and within the range calculated by the very section of the sentencing
guidelines that was the subject of the crack amendment-is unfair and legally unnecessary. The Federal Sentencing Commission made no indication
that it intended to exclude these defendants from the benefits of the crack
amendment. Further, the existing statutory language, though muddled, certainly permits a reading that would entitle the defendants to these benefits.
In light of these facts, excluding this group of defendants from the benefits
of the retroactive application of the crack amendment would run counter to
the goals of the legislation.

